Tag Archive for 'SEC'

Alcatel-Lucent SA Settles US Bribery Charges

It has been widely reported that Paris-based Alcatel-Lucent SA has settled US  charges for bribing officials in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, and Taiwan.

The French telecoms giant  was formed in 2006 after US-based Lucent Technologies merged with French-based Alcatel. It works for companies and governments around the world, proving solutions for voice, data, and video, including through its Bell Labs subsidiary.   It has operations in more than 130 countries, revenue of €15.2bn (2009) and employs over 77,000 people.   Its corporate website is here.

It was announced on 28 December 2010 that the company and three subsidiaries will pay $137m in total comprising $92m to resolve criminal charges with the DOJ and $45m in disgorgement to the SEC. It had already  paid $10m in January to settle corruption charges brought by the government of Costa Rica.

The DOJ and the parent company entered into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (‘DPA’) for violating the accounting (internal controls and books and records) provisions of the FCPA. There were no charges brought under the anti-bribery provisions against the top company. Three subsidiaries (Alcatel-Lucent France S.A., formerly known as Alcatel CIT S.A.; Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G., formerly known as Alcatel Standard A.G.; and Alcatel Centroamerica S.A., formerly known as Alcatel de Costa Rica S.A.) were also charged and each agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to violate the antibribery, as well as the accounting provisions of the FCPA.  A compliance monitor was imposed for a 3 year period.

The charges relate to behavior in Alcatel between 1999 and 2006. DOJ prosecutors said Alcatel-Lucent’s three subsidiaries bribed foreign officials to win business in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The company also hired agents without proper controls in Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Angola, Ivory Coast, Uganda, and Mali. Overall, Alcatel-Lucent admitted making $48.1 million in profits as a result of its bribery.

The SEC’s civil complaint said all of Alcatel-Lucent’s bribes were “undocumented or improperly recorded as consulting fees in the books of Alcatel’s subsidiaries and then consolidated into Alcatel’s financial statements. The leaders of several Alcatel subsidiaries and geographical regions, including some who reported directly to Alcatel’s executive committee, either knew or were severely reckless in not knowing about the misconduct.”

Interestingly, one of the terms of the DPA was that  Alcatel-Lucent agreed  to stop using third-party sales and marketing agents in conducting its worldwide business. The DOJ said the unprecedented pledge was made on the company’s “own initiative and at a substantial financial cost.”

The other side of the merged company, Lucent, FCPA charges of its own in December 2007 with the DOJ and SEC. The settlement included a $1m criminal fine with the DOJ and $1.5m in civil penalties with the SEC. Lucent’s offenses involved payment of travel expenses for Chinese government officials from 2000 to 2003.

The case appears to stem from investigations by Costa Rican authorities, which Alcatel learned of in 2004.  the investigations. It fired Christian Sapsizian, a French citizen and the company’s deputy vice president for Latin America and disclosed to the DOJ  authorities that it had uncovered payments from employees and consultants to government officials and political parties. In September 2008, Sapsizian was sentenced to 30 months in prison for breaching the FCPA by bribing employees of the state-owned telecoms company in Costa Rica.

The FCPA Blog has further information, including the original DOJ and SEC charges, here.

Innospec Settles (but only just) in the UK and the US: the SFO’s prosecution strategy is severely dented

Innospec is a specialty chemical maker listed in the US, and with a significant operation – Innospec Ltd – based in Ellesmere Port in the UK.

Executives were charged with conspiring to give corrupt payments to executives of Pertamina, an Indonesian state owned refinery in return for contracts to supply its old-technology anti-knock fuel additive Tetra-ethyl Lead between 2002 and 2006. Prosecutors also investigated making payments to Iraqi officials under the Oil for Food program, and in the US, selling some $20m of chemicals to Cuba without a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which is a still a violation of the Trading With the Enemy Act.

The US authorities began to investigate Innospec in 2005, and the SFO began to take a serious interest in 2007. The directors decided to admit wrongdoing in late 2008, and following the usual protracted negotiations as to the amount of the fine, with involvement by the SFO, DOJ, SEC, and OFAC, a deal was eventually struck. It was heralded as the first formal joint SFO/DOJ settlement, with a agreed fine being divied-up between UK and US regulators, and the appointment of a joint UK/US compliance monitor.

Innospec’s ability to pay was a key factor in the relatively small amount of the penalty – which had been agreed at $25.8m (payable in stages up to 2013) plus a further $14.4m which was contingent and performance-related (making a total of $40.2m). Profits resulting from the transgressions were likely to have been in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and following current US sentencing formulae the penalties could easily have been in the $500m ballpark. The total penalty here is a comparative drop in the ocean, and a great result for Innospec.

The SFO thought that they should take 50% of the agreed penalty, on the basis that the criminality was largely orchestrated and controlled from the UK (perfectly reasonable you might think). The US authorities on the other hand thought that they should have the majority of the fine, because, they had done some of the work, there were more of them, and er…. they could. So after some behind the scenes machinations, the UK’s share of the penalty was eventually agreed at 31% ($12.7m). Of this, $6.7m was planned to be allocated to a criminal fine or confiscation to be imposed in the Crown Court (in respect of Indonesia transgressions) with the balance being the subject of a civil settlement (in respect of Iraq OFF transgressions). Meanwhile, in the US, the penalty had been negotiated at $27.5m, comprising a fine of $14.1m to the DOJ, disgorgement of $11.2m to the SEC and $2.2m to OFAC. As part of both plea agreements, Innospec agreed to enter into a compliance monitoring agreement and it was proposed that a joint US and UK monitor be appointed. The press releases and 10-K announcements were duly drafted.

Such FCPA settlements have been routine in the US over the past few years. All that was required was the respective UK and US courts to rubber stamp the deal. But this is when the real problems started…..

The SFO initially put the agreed Innospec settlement in front of Southwark Crown Court for the deal to be approved. However, the Court was not impressed. His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin QC, the Senior Resident Judge recused himself from the hearing, describing the plea bargaining proposals as:

deeply wrong

He instructed the parties to return properly represented at a later date to present the case to a more senior Court of Appeal Judge. Accordingly, the matter came again before Southwark Crown Court on 18 March 2010 when the company formally pleaded guilty. Lord Justice Thomas (Britain’s second most senior criminal judge) also declined to endorse the deal. So concerned was he that he deferred sentencing to 26 March and provided a detailed sentencing memorandum (which can be found here). Although he does not overturn the plea bargain, he concluded that the SFO does not have power to enter into plea arrangements such as this and unequivocally stated that:

no such arrangements should be made again.

We have set out the Court’s objections below, but in fact there was little about the deal that the Thomas really did like.

The level of the penalty

wholly inadequate as a fine to reflect the criminality displayed by Innospec

He made it clear that he considered the fine much too low, in part because the profits made in the UK by Innospec Ltd alone may have been as high as $160m, all of which could (should?) have been subject to disgorgement. If it had been up to him to decide, the fine would have been in the tens of millions.

He commented that:

both the SFO and DOJ agreed that the fines and other penalties which might be imposed in the US and the UK might exceed $400m in the US and $150m in the UK.

The Judge was seemingly also unhappy with the agreed split, thinking that there was scant rationale for deviating from an equal split between the penalty to be paid in the UK and the US.

Ultimately though, Thomas LJ upheld the agreed $12.7m fine, however he did so because he viewed that it would be unjust and unfair to impose a penalty greater than the amount agreed over a period of extensive negotiations between the SFO, the US authorities and the company’s advisors.

Prosecutors agreeing the level of a fine with the defendant

SFO cannot enter into an agreement … with an offender, as to the penalty in respect of the offence charged

Although counsel for the SFO pointed out that the penalties agreed were merely suggestions, they were clearly more than this. This does not bode well for the SFO’s pipeline of prosecutions.

Compliance monitors

The Judge also had a major problem with the appointment of the compliance monitor. Such appointments have been commonplace in DOJ settlements, although their scope and cost has been reined in since the early “$50m…boonbongles” (per District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle – more here).

The Judge considered that imposing a compliance monitor on a company with new management team in place is an expensive form of checking, some of which can be done by its auditors. The huge cost of an Innospec compliance monitor would be far better used for fines, confiscation or compensation.

The use of civil recovery orders

it will…rarely be appropriate for criminal conduct by a company to be dealt with by means of a civil recovery order.

The SFO see CROs as one of their key weapons in their bribery prosecution strategy, hoping that corporates will be encouraged to self-report and accept a negotiated civil penalty for the less serious crimes. Such civil penalties would not amount to a criminal conviction, which of course leads to automatic mandatory debarment from government contracts under the EU procurement directives.

As part of a CRO, part of the proceeds goes to the people or country which suffered. In this case however, it would have been unfair for Indonesia (the behavior in respect of which was dealt with by a fine) and Iraq (the behavior which was deal with by a CRO, and who would therefore have received some degree of reparations) to be treated differently.

The SFO allocating an agreed penalty between a fine and a confiscation

Under protocols agreed with the Home Office, the prosecuting authority and the investigating authority both keep 18.75% of the fine. So when the SFO act in both roles, they are entitled to 37.5% of any confiscation. There is a potential conflict therefore in the SFO’s role, if it is recommending to Courts (or going even stronger than this and all but agreeing the amounts with the corporate) how a settlement should be split between fines and confiscations.

Press releases agreed between the company and the SFO

it would be inconceivable for a prosecutor to approve a press statement to be made by a person convicted of burglary or rape; companies who are guilty of corruption should be treated no differently to others who commit serious crimes.

Enough said.

The sentencing remarks can be found here.

To summarise therefore, again per Thomas LJ, the SFO “had no power to enter into the arrangements made” to settle the matter and “no such arrangements should be made again.” So its now going to be a busy time for Alderman to talk to the senior judiciary to plan how future plea negotiations are going to look.

Denmark’s Novo Nordisk settles Oil for Food action

The FCPA Blog has reported that Novo Nordisk A/S, the Danish  healthcare company and diabetes specilist, has agreed a deferred prosecution agreement with a $9million criminal penalty with the DOJ, plus a $3million civil penalty, and $6million disgorgement of profits with the SEC. Apparently no corporate monitor though. The FCPA Blog post can be found here.

Novo Nordisk was supplying insulin and other medicines to the Iraqi ministry of health, under the Oil for Food programme.  As is well kown by now, the Oil-for-Food Program was established by the UN to enable Iraq to sell its oil for humanitarian purposes, in the context of an extensive international sanctions regime. The program mandated that the proceeds of oil sales be deposited in a UN escrow account and that those proceeds be used by the Iraqi government only to purchase humanitarian goods and services, such a food and medicine, approved by the UN.  

As was common at that time, and beginning in 2000, the former Iraqi government began requiring companies wishing to sell humanitarian goods to government ministries to pay a kickback, often mischaracterized as an “after sales services fee,” to the government in order to be granted a contract.  The amount of that fee was usually 10 percent of the contract price. 

As set out by the SEC, the scheme operated in a manner fairly typical of that which we are seeing in several compnaies under fire under Oil for Food investigations.    

Novo Nordisk engaged its long-time Jordan-based agent to submit bids on Novo Nordisk’s behalf to Kimadia, the Iraq State Company for the Importation and Distribution of Drugs and Medical Appliances, under the Program. Two branches of Novo Nordisk — RONE, based in Athens, Greece, and NEO, based in Amman, Jordan — handled the sales to Iraq and supplied the agent with bid prices for each contract. In late 2000 or early 2001, a Kimadia import manager advised the agent that Kimadia required Novo Nordisk to pay a ten percent kickback in order to obtain a contract under the Program. The Kimadia import manager told the agent that Novo Nordisk should increase its prices by ten percent and pay that amount to Kimadia. By doing so, Novo Nordisk would recover the secret kickback from the U.N. escrow account when the contract, with the inflated price, was subsequently approved for disbursement and paid by the U.N.

A Novo Nordisk officer rejected the request to pay Kimadia a ten percent kickback, and instead suggested that Novo Nordisk find another way. Novo Nordisk offered to reduce the price of its medicines by ten percent, but the Kimadia import manager angrily refused the offer. A Novo Nordisk Senior Vice President, along with RONE and NEO managers authorized the kickbacks to Kimadia despite the other officer’s refusal to do so. On or about April 2001 and August 2001, respectively, Novo Nordisk paid increased commissions to its agent to pay the kickbacks to Kimadia. The agent’s commission was increased under the guise that the payment was used to cover the agent’s increased distribution and marketing costs. Various e-mails discussed the scheme to conceal the conduct, and the U.N. contracts were artificially inflated by ten percent. According to the RONE managers, subsequent kickbacks were also approved by Novo Nordisk. Altogether, Novo Nordisk made a total of $1,437,946 in improper kickback payments on eleven contracts through the agent. Novo Nordisk also agreed to pay approximately $1,315,454 in ASSFs on two additional contracts. Novo Nordisk recorded the kickbacks as legitimate commission payments on its books and records. 

The DOJ agreement states that….

Between 2001 and 2003, Novo paid approximately $1.4 million to the former Iraqi government by inflating the price of contracts by 10 percent before submitting the contracts to the United Nations for approval and concealed from the United Nations the fact that the price contained a kickback to the former Iraqi government. Novo also admitted it inaccurately recorded the kickback payments as “commissions” in its books and records.

As an accountant, we like the numbers.  So in summary, bribes of $2,753,400 to secure contracts worth EUR 22 million.  Novo Nordisk was ordered to disgorge $4,321,523 in profits plus $1,683,556 in pre-judgment interest, and to pay a civil penalty of $3,025,066.

The DOJ complaint is here, the DOJ press release is here, and the SEC press release is here.   

English Courts grant freezing injunction at the request of the SEC

Our friends at Fulbright & Jaworski alerted us to this interesting case.   Their technical release can be found here.  

The UK’s Court of Appeal has upheld a decision to allow a freezing order requested by the SEC, freezing the UK assets of a UK citizen.   The SEC alleged that the defendant was controller of a US-registered company that had promoted a fraudulent investment scheme.  It  sought an order for disgorgement of profits and a civil penalty.

Looking to secure the UK defendant’s assets for the purposes of enforcement of the US relief, the SEC applied to the High Court for a freezing order in respect of those assets, which it obtained.  The defendant appealed, but the Court of Appeal upheld the judgement.

 The full appeal judgement (SEC v Manterfield) can be found here.  

The Halliburton/Kellogg Brown & Root fine

Before costs and knock-on effects,  the long awaited Halliburton/KBR total penalty was $579million, the second largest in FCPA history, behind Siemens.  It is in line with what commentators and the company was expecting. It is clear though that large fines are now the norm, and they’re getting larger.  

The KBR settlement story is better told in the FCPA Blog post here.

DOJ

The plea agreement with the DOJ fined KBR $402m.   The  plea agreement can be found here.  

The fine is based on the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations, which are a bit of a mystery to  us  over on this side of the pond.   To arrive at the eventual fine  requires first  an estimate of a ‘base fine’ which is modified based on a multiplier dependant on what is called a ‘culpability score’.  And from there, there is considrable negotiating.  

Here, the ‘base fine’ was $235.5m being the “value of the benefit received in return for the lawful payments”.  The ‘Culpability Score’ was 8, which was a base Culpability Score of 5, to which was added further 5 because the organisation had more than 5,000 employees and high ranking personnel within the organisation participated in, condoned, or were wilfully ignorant of the offence.    2 points were deducted from the score by virtue of the fact that KBR fully co-operated in the investigation and took responsibility for its previous conduct.  Applying the guidelines, the culpability score of 8 gives a ‘multiplier’ of between 1.6 and 3.2 which is applied to the base fine, giving the fine a possible range between $376.8m and $753.6m.

The actual fine agreed was $402m, which is approximately $25m (6.7%) higher than  the minimum amount.  This “reflects the egregiousness and long  duration of the criminal conduct, KBR’s leadership in that conduct, and the fact that KBR’s use of international sales agents does not appear to have been limited to a single project.”  

By contrast, the Siemens fine was way below the minimum, reflecting apparently the extraordinary remediation efforts.  

The KBR fine was payable in instalments:  $50million within 5 days, then $50million per quarter until October 2010.  The fine is not tax deductible.  KBR also has now to appoint a corporate monitor for 3 years. 

SEC

The SEC order was for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits amounting to $177million.   The SEC complaint is here, and the litigation release is here.  

As a deterrent effect, the DOJ is routinely seeking jail time for the key executives. Here,  Albert “Jack” Stanley, pleaded guilty in September 2008 to conspiring to violate the FCPA. His sentencing is scheduled for May 2009, and he faces seven years in prison and a restitution payment of $10.8 million. 

Further information on Stanley can be found here.  His plea agreement is here.